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Abstract 
Combating malware is very important for software/systems security, but to prevent the 
software/systems from the advanced malware, viz. metamorphic malware is a challenging 
task, as it changes the structure/code after each infection. Therefore in this paper, we 
present a novel approach to detect the advanced malware with high accuracy by 
analyzing the occurrence of opcodes (features) by grouping the executables. These groups 
are made on the basis of our earlier studies [1] that the difference between the sizes of 
any two malware generated by popular advanced malware kits viz. PS-MPC, G2 and 
NGVCK are within 5 KB. On the basis of obtained promising features, we studied the 
performance of thirteen classifiers using N-fold cross-validation available in machine 
learning tool WEKA. Among these thirteen classifiers we studied in-depth top five 
classifiers (Random forest, LMT, NBT, J48 and FT) and obtain more than 96.28% 
accuracy for the detection of unknown malware, which is better than the maximum 
detection accuracy (~95.9%) reported by Santos et al (2013). In these top five classifiers, 
our approach obtained a detection accuracy of ∼97.95% by the Random forest. 
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1. Introduction 
“Malware refers to a program that is inserted into a system, usually covertly, with the 
intent of compromising the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the victim’s data, 
applications, or operating system or of otherwise annoying or disrupting the victim” [2]. 
From the last four decades, malware is continuously evolving with high complexity to 
evade the available detection technique. These malware are basically classified as first 
and second generation malware. In the first generation, structure of the malware does not 
change, while in the second generation, structure changes to generate a new variant, 
keeping the action same [3]. On the basis of how variances are created in malware, second 
generation malware are further classified into Encrypted, Oligormorphic, Polymorphic 
and Metamorphic Malware [4]. These malware changes its structure in random and 
unpredictable ways each time it replicates, hence hard to detect. According to McAfee 
technical report of 2014, there are more than 200 million known malware samples [5]. 
The Symantec 2014 Internet Security Threat report states that 2013 was the mega breach 
year [6] (~62% more breaches then 2012). The F-secure document reported an increase in 
malware attacks against mobile devices based on Android and Apple iOS [7]. This 
increase in threat from malware is due to wide spread use of World Wide Web. An 
estimate shows that the web-based attacks were increased 36% with over 4,500 new 
attacks each day, annoying/disrupting the victim in terms of confidentiality, integrity, 
availability of the victims data etc. [8]. The malware attacks/threat are not only limited to 
individual level, but there are state sponsored highly skilled hackers developing 
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customized malware to disrupt industries and for military espionage [9]. Such attacks can 
alter the operation of industrial systems, disrupt power plants, e.g. the StuxNet and Duqu 
malware [10]. The intrusion into Google’s systems demonstrates how well-organized 
attacks are designed to maintain long-term access to an organization’s network [11]. 
To combat threats/attacks from the malware, signature-based software (anti-malware) 
were widely deployed. However, its an indisputable fact that these traditional approach of 
combating the threats/attack with a technology-centric are ineffective to detect today’s 
highly sophisticated customized malware. Hence attacks from such malware to the 
computing world are increasing every day. The consequence will be devastating if in time 
adequate measures had not been taken. Therefore, there is a need that both academia and 
anti-malware developers should continually work to combat the threats/attacks from the 
evolving malware. The most popular techniques used for the detection of malware are 
signature matching, heuristics-based detection, malware normalization, machine learning, 
etc. [4]. In recent years, machine learning techniques are studied by many authors and 
proposed different approaches [12] [13] [14], which can supplement traditional anti-
malware system. For the detection of malware by machine learning technique, feature 
selection plays a vital role. In the literature, many feature selection approaches are 
discussed viz. Olivier Henchiri et al. 2006 [15], Siddiqui et al. 2008 [16], B. Mehdi et al. 
2009 [17] and Santos et al. 2013 [18] used hierarchical, unary variable removal method, 
Goodness evaluator and Weighted Term Frequency (WTF) respectively for the feature 
selection. The maximum accuracy they obtained was 95.26%. In this paper, our approach 
outperforms the accuracy obtained by these authors by more than ∼2%.  
The paper is organized as follow, in next section related work is discussed and in 
section 3 we present our approach, The section 4 discuss the experimental results and 
finally section 5 contains the conclusion of the paper. 
 
2. Related work 
The first virus was created in 1970 [19] and since then there is a strong contest 
between the attackers and defenders. This rat-race led to the improvement in both 
malware and its detection techniques. To defend the malware attacks, anti-malware 
groups are developing new techniques. On the other hand, malware developers are 
adopting new tactics/methods to avoid the malware detectors. Initially, the tools and 
techniques of malware analysis were in the domain of anti-malware vendors. 
However, the use of malware for espionage, sophisticated cyber attacks and other 
crimes motivated the academicians and digital investigators to develop an advanced 
method to combat the threats/attacks from it. In the year 2001, Schultz et al. [20] 
were the first to introduce the concept of data mining for detecting malware. They 
used three different static features for malware classification (Portable Executable, 
strings and byte sequences). Kolter and Maloof (2004) evaluated data sets using 
Instance-Based Learning Algorithms (IBK), TF-IDF, Naive Bayes, Support Vector 
Machine (SVM) and Decision tree [21]. Among the classifiers used by them, 
Decision tree outperformed. In the year 2005, Karim et al. [22] addressed the 
tracking of malware evolution based on opcode sequences and permutations. O. 
Henchiri et al. (2006) proposed a hierarchical feature extraction algorithm and used 
ID3, j48, Naive Bayes and SMO classifier and obtained the maximum of 92.56% 
accuracy [15]. In the year 2007, Bilar uses small dataset (67 malware and 20 benign 
samples) to examine the difference in opcode frequency distribution between 
malicious and benign programs [23]. He found that malware opcode distribution 
differs significantly from benign programs and also observed that some opcodes 
seen to be a stronger predictor of frequency variation. He however, did not apply it 
for the classification of advanced malware. In the year 2008, Tian et al. particularly 
classified Trojan malware using function length frequency [24]. Their results 
indicate that the function length 
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malware family and can be combined with other features for fast and scalable 
malware classification. In the year 2008, Siddiqui et al. [16] used variable length 
instruction sequence for detecting worms in the wild. They tested their method on a 
data set of 2774 (1444 worms and 1330 benign files) and got 95.6% detection 
accuracy. In the year 2008, Moskovitch et al. [25] [26] compared the different 
classifiers by byte-sequence n-grams (3, 4, 5 or 6). Among the classifiers they 
studied BDT, DT and ANN outperformed NB, BNB and SVM classifiers, exhibiting 
lower false positive rates. S. Momina Tabish (2009) used AdaBoostM1 algorithm 
for classification by taking n-gram frequency as a feature and reported 90% 
detection accuracy [27]. In the year 2010, Bilal Mehdi et. al. [28] used hyper-grams 
(generalized n-gram) and obtained 87.85% detection accuracy and claimed no false 
alarm. Santos et al. in the year 2011 pointed out that supervised learning requires a 
significant amount of labeled executables for both malware and benign programs, 
which is difficult to obtain, hence they proposed a semi-supervised learning method 
for detecting unknown malware, which does not require a large amount of labeled 
data [29]. They obtained 86% of accuracy by labeling only 50% of the selected data 
set. In the subsequent paper [18] in 2013, they used Term Frequency for modeling 
different classifiers and found that SVM outperforms with accuracy of 92.92% and 
95.90% respectively for one opcode and two opcode sequence length respectively. 
Recently in 2014, Kevin Allix et al. [12] took a size-able dataset of over 50,000 
android applications and implemented using 4 well-known machine learning 
algorithms (RandomForest, J48, JRip and LibSVM) with ten-fold cross-validation. 
He claimed his approach outperformed existing machine learning approaches, 
however on usual size datasets performance does not translate in the wild. 
 
3. Our approach 
In order to uncover the unknown malware with high accuracy, our novel approach 
as shown in Figure 1 involves finding the promising features (Algo. 1), training of 
classifiers and detection of unknown malware.  
 
3.1. Building the Datasets and Feature Selection 
To build the datasets, we downloaded 11088 malware from malacia-project [30] 
and collected 4006 benign programs (cross checked from virustotal.com [31]) from 
different systems. 
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Figure 1. Flow chart for the detection of unknown malware. 
 
Algorithm 1: Feature Selection 
 
INPUT: Pre-processed data of all groups,  
Nb→ Number of benign executables and Nm→ Number of malware executables 
OUTPUT: List of features.  
  BEGIN  
  for all groups GK  do 
            for all  ith  benign executable in the group GK do  
                       Compute the normalized frequency FKb of each opcode oj  
          
bKF (oj ) = ( fi (oj )) / Nb∑   
            end for  
            for all ith malware executable in the group GK do 
                      Compute the normalized frequency FKm of each opcode oj   
                     
mKF (oj ) = ( fi (oj )) / Nm∑  
            end for  
            for all opcode oj do  
                       Subtract the frequencies Fkb and Fkm.  
                      KD (oj ) = bKF (oj )− mKF (oj )  
              end for  
 Sort the obtained DK(o).  
    end for 
   Set a threshold on Dk(o) to select the promising opcodes features such that from each      
Gk at least 10 opcodes get selected.   
  return  Union of the selected features of all the groups.  
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The promising features of the executables are obtained by clubbing the dataset in 
5 KB size of 100 groups [1] as in the collected dataset ~97.18% malware are below 
500 KB (Figure 2) and the difference between the sizes of any two malware 
generated by popular advanced malware kits viz. NGVCK [32], PS-MPC [33] and 
G2 [34] are within 5 KB. Hence, the features obtained will have a signature of 
maximum executables to detect the unknown malware. Our features are opcodes of 
the executables obtained by objdump utility available in the Linux system. To 
identify the each opcode we labeled it with a fixed integer. To differentiate malware 
and benign programs we obtained the features as given in algo. 1. 
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Figure 2. Number of malware with respect to file size. 
3.2.  Training of the classifiers 
To find the best classifiers for detection of unknown malware, we investigated thirteen 
tree based classifiers viz. Random forest, J48, REPTREE, LMT, Decision stump, ADT, 
NBT, FT, LAD, Random Tree, Simple CART, BFT and J48 Graft available in the popular 
and widely used suite of machine learning software known as WEKA (a collection of 
visualization tools and algorithms for data analysis and predictive modeling, together with 
graphical user interfaces for easy access to this functionality). Then with the obtained 
features, we run the WEKA n-fold cross-validation to train all the selected classifiers. 
Figure 3 shows the accuracy obtained by all classifiers for n = 2,4,6...,16 folds. We 
observed that Random forest is the best classifier and its accuracy is almost flat after n = 
2. Rest twelve classifiers accuracy fluctuates, however after ten-fold cross-validation the 
fluctuations are least and we observe maximum correctness in the accuracy.  
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Figure 3. Accuracy of the thirteen classifiers with N-fold cross validation. 
3.3  Detection of unknown malware 
Among the thirteen studied classifier, we selected top five (Random forest, LMT, 
NBT, J48 and FT) for in-depth analysis. To study the overall performance of these 
classifiers, we randomly selected 750 malware and 610 benign programs from all the 
groups, such that at least five executables from each group can be randomly tested by the 
trained classifiers with ten-fold cross-validation for the detection of unknown malware.  
4. Experimental Results 
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Figure 4. Normalized opcode occurrence of all the collected malware and 
benign program keeping threshold 0.02. 
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Figure 5. Normalized opcode occurrence of the malware and benign 
program of size 10-15 KB keeping threshold 0.02.  
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Figure 6. Normalized opcode occurrence of the malware and benign 
program of size 140-145 KB keeping threshold 0.02.  
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Figure 7. Normalized opcode occurrence of the malware and benign 
program of size 240-245 KB keeping threshold 0.02.  
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Figure 8. Normalized opcode occurrence of the malware and benign 
program of size 415-420 KB keeping threshold 0.02.  
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Figure 9. Difference in the occurrence of respective opcodes between 
benign and malware program of size 0-5 KB and 15-20 KB keeping 
threshold 0.02.  
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Figure 10. Difference in the occurrence of respective opcodes between 
benign and malware program of size 30-35 KB and 55-60 KB keeping 
threshold 0.02.  
As discussed in section 3, we disassembled all the malware and benign programs of 
below 500 KB size. Then we computed the normalized opcode occurrence of all malware 
and benign programs, for each group separately. We observed that the opcode occurrence 
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in the malware and benign programs differ in large. Fig. 4 shows the normalized opcode 
occurrence of all the malware and benign programs and fig 5,  6,  7, &  8 shows the 
normalized opcode occurrence for the group 10-15, 140-145, 240-245 & 415-420 KB size 
respectively keeping the lower threshold 0.02. To find the dominant features of malware 
and benign programs we computed the difference in opcode occurrence between the 
benign and malware programs of each group and found that dominant opcodes vary from 
group to group. Figure 9. shows the difference in the occurrence of respective opcodes 
between benign and malware program of size 0-5 KB and 15-20 KB size keeping the 
lower threshold 0.02. Similarly, fig 10 is plotted for the size 30-35 and 55-60 KB size of 
the data set. In the figure 9, 10 upper side shows the opcodes that dominate in benign and 
lower side shows the opcode that dominates in malware. 
The effectiveness of the top five classifiers viz. Random forest Tree, LMT, NBT, J48 
and FT has been studied with the randomly selected 750 malware and 610 benign 
programs. The analysis are done in WEKA with ten-fold cross-validation, in terms of True 
Positive Ratio (TPR), True Negative Ratio (TNR), False Positive Ratio (FPR), False 
Negative Ratio (FNR) and accuracy, defined as 
 TPR= TPTM ;      TNR= 
TN
TB ;      FPR= 
FP
TB ;      FNR= 
FN
TM  
 Accuracy= TP+TNTM+TB×100 
where,  
TP⟶ True positive, the number of malware correctly classified  
TN⟶ True negative, the number of benign correctly classified. 
FP⟶ False positive, the number of benign detected as malware. 
FN⟶ False negative, the number of malware detected as benign. 
TM⟶ Total number of malware. 
TB⟶ Total number of benign.  
 
From the analysis, it is clear that Random forest is the best classifier for identification 
of unknown malware. Nevertheless, the other classifiers are also reasonably good (> 
96.2%) for the detection of unknown malware. The detail results obtained are shown in 
table 1.  
Table 1. Performance of the top 5 classifiers. 
Classifiers True positive False negative False positive True Negative Accuracy 
Random forest 739 (98.53%) 11 (1.47%) 6 (2.81%) 554 (97.19%) 97.95% 
LMT 734 (97.87%) 16 (2.13%) 23 (4.04%) 547 (95.96%) 97.04% 
NBT 728 (97.07%) 22(2.93%) 19 (3.33%) 551 (96.67%) 96.89% 
J48 729 (97.2%) 21 (2.8%) 23 (4.04%) 547 (95.96%) 96.66% 
FT 729 (97.2%) 21 (2.8%) 8 (4.91%) 542 (95.09%) 96.28% 
We found that the classifier NBT, J48 and FT have the almost same True positive ratio. In 
these, the overall accuracy of Functional Tree classifier is lowest, which is basically due 
to high False positive ratio. Figure 11 shows the variation of False positive and False 
negative of the studied classifiers. We found that the False positives ratio of Random 
forest and LMT are almost double than False positive ratio, however for overall accuracy 
both has to be low. From Figure 12 we observed that the True positives of all classifiers 
are more biased towards the detection of malware. The obtained accuracy for all five 
classifiers are shown in Figure 13 and the comparison of our results with Santos et al., 
Siddiqui et al., Asaf Shabtai et. al. for Random forest and Mehdi et al., Santos et al., 
Olivier Henchiri et al. for J48 are shown in Figure 14. Among these authors our approach 
uncover the malware with the best accuracy (~97.95%). 
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Figure 14. Comparison of the accuracy obtained by our approach and 
others.  
 13 
 
5. Conclusion 
Traditional approach i.e. updating the signature database to combat advanced malware 
is ineffective. Therefore, in this paper, we presented a novel approach to detect the 
advanced malware with high accuracy. For the classification, we obtained the promising 
features (opcodes) by grouping the executables in 5 KB size. Extensive experiment has 
been done to study the performance of the classifiers viz. Random forest, LMT, NBT, J48 
and FT in terms of TPR, TNR, FPR, FNR and accuracy by analyzing 11688 malware 
downloaded from malicia-project and 4006 benign programs collected from different 
systems. By our approach all five classifiers are able to uncover unknown malware with 
greater than 96.28% accuracy, which is better than the detection accuracy (~95.9%) 
reported by Santos et. al. (2013). Among these classifiers, we found that Random forest is 
the best (∼97.95%) classifier to detect the unknown malware. Thus, our approach 
outperforms to detect the unknown malware and hence can be an effective technique to 
complement the signature based mechanism or dynamic analysis. In future, we will 
collect more malware and benign and will perform in-depth size analysis for the 
classification of unknown malware. 
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